In their recent study, Zalla et al. (2014) explore how regret and disappointment are affected in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). The study is motivated by previous indications of ASD co-morbidity with emotion processing deficits, as well as suggestions that the mechanisms important for social cognition (typically thought to be affected in ASDs) may also underlie a variety of self-reflective cognitive and emotional processes. Zalla et al. advance this field of research by specifically testing emotional responses and choice behaviour of ASDs in an entirely private decision-making context. By so doing, they raise the possibility that emotional processing deficits in ASDs may not depend on social cognition, since experiences of regret are caused by, and influence only, the chooser themselves. Moreover, by studying regret and disappointment specifically, as opposed to responses to negative events more generally, they highlight the possibility that particular deficits exist in the processing of counterfactual emotions, i.e., those that rely on comparisons between what is and what might have been but which vary in their attributions of personal responsibility.
The study finds that individuals with ASDs lack the ability to distinguish between experiences of regret and disappointment, though they show a preserved behavioural impact of these emotions on later choice. Zalla and colleagues interpret these findings as reflecting a "failure to overtly integrate selfrelevant emotional information with inferential reasoning processes" in ASDs. Critically, they stress that these deficits can manifest even when these emotions are entirely selfreflective e i.e., in decision contexts that do not rely on social cognition. They discuss these findings in relation to alexithymia-like diminished emotional awareness, but with covert impacts of emotional arousal on behaviour. These findings raise a number of intriguing questions which, if answered, may add greatly to our understanding of the deficits associated with ASDs and of the mechanisms underlying healthy processing of counterfactual emotions.
Despite Zalla et al.'s focus on an emotional processing deficit, we question whether these findings could yet be explained by a purely social-cognition account. In order to experience both regret and disappointment, one must be able to generate alternative (i.e., counterfactual) states of the world, and to take the perspective of the fictive versions of ourselves that experience these alternative states. While the ability to take the perspective of others has long been thought to be affected in ASDs, less is known about the ability to take the perspective of fictive/counterfactual versions of oneself. However, there is evidence that ASDs develop and deploy counterfactual inference abilities in an atypical way (Begeer, Terwogt, Lunenburg, & Stegge, 2009; Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004) .
Is it possible that the ability for counterfactual thinking is itself impaired in the ASDs? Zalla et al. addressed this issue by measuring performance on Roese and Olson's Counterfactual
